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ABSTRACT
Given the exponential growth in mobile phone usage,
more businesses are adopting mobile communication
strategies to engage with existing and potential customers.
With 97% of all mobile marketing text messages being
opened by their intended recipients, mobile text message
marketing is both effective and lucrative. However,
businesses must ensure that such messages comply with the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which
generally prohibits sending unsolicited commercial text
messages. Indeed, TCPA litigation has become the recent
darling of class action lawyers due to uncapped statutory
damages and is sure to increase with the heightened
consent regulations promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), effective October 16,
2013. However, businesses cannot escape liability simply
by obtaining prior express consent, as more businesses are
being forced into multi-million dollar settlements for
exceeding the scope of consent granted by their mobile
customers. This Article examines recent trends in how the
FCC and the courts are delineating the contours of consent
for mobile text messaging under the TCPA and provides
ways businesses can engage with mobile customers without
running afoul of the TCPA.
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INTRODUCTION
2014 is shaping up to be an explosive year in Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) mobile text messaging litigation.
Recently, the Buffalo Bills NFL team approved a $3 million
settlement for sending three too many text messages to the team’s
mobile subscribers over a two-week period in violation of the
TCPA. 1 The takeaway message is clear: businesses and their
counsel need to be vigilant about TCPA compliance and ensure
that all mobile text communications fall within the scope of
consent provided by the customer. 2 However, the available
guidance is far from clear, given that the TCPA is silent as to what
forms of mobile communications are permissible. 3 For instance, if
1

Don’t Text & Cheer: Fan Sues Buffalo Bills for $3 Million, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BLOG (May 12, 2014, 11:04 am),
https://www.uschamber.com/blog/don-t-text-cheer-fan-sues-buffalo-bills-3million.
2
While the TCPA is arguably the most important federal law applicable to
mobile marketing, it is important to note the existence of other relevant
consumer protection rules beyond the scope of this Article, such as the Federal
Trade Commission’s analogous Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). See generally
William B. Baker, The Complications of Doing Mobile Marketing Legally, 17
NO. 8 J. INTERNET L. 13 (2014).
3
See, e.g., In the Matter of GroupMe, Inc./ Skype Commc'ns Petition for
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a customer consents to participating in a text-based social network,
can the network then send the customer an administrative text
message confirming the customer’s interest without violating the
TCPA? 4
In recent years, the FCC and the courts are increasingly
determining the scope of consent required from the context of a
given mobile transaction in light of reasonable consumer
expectations and industry norms. 5 While this shift towards a more
common sense approach is effectively expanding the scope of
consent for mobile communications, businesses and their counsel
must continue to closely monitor FCC declaratory rulings and
court decisions to properly assess compliance risks. This Article
examines emerging trends in delineating the scope of consent for
mobile text messages under the TCPA. Part I describes the
rationale and relevant rules governing consent under the TCPA.
Part II then analyzes two recent FCC declaratory rulings and three
recent court decisions. Finally, Part III focuses on three common
instances where unwary businesses can exceed the scope of
consent granted by their mobile customers, and provides
recommendations for minimizing such risks.
I. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA to protect consumers
from the growing numbers of telemarketing calls and faxes that
Expedited Declaratory Ruling Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel.
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 59 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1554 (F.C.C.
Mar. 27, 2014) (finding that the TCPA is ambiguous as to how a consumer’s
consent should be obtained); see also Michael O’Rielly, TCPA: It’s Time to
Provide Clarity, OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/
tcpa-it-time-provide-clarity (“[TCPA’s] lack of clarity [is] evidenced by an
increasing number of TCPA-related law suits and a growing backlog of petitions
pending at the FCC.”).
4
Although the FCC determined in a March 27, 2014 declaratory ruling that
such texts are proper under the TCPA, other consent issues remain, such as
whether consent is extinguished for reassigned phone numbers.
5
See, e.g., Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL
794802, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (“Many courts . . . have nonetheless
found consent to send text messages based on the context of the transaction in
which a consumer provides her cellular number.”).
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one TCPA sponsor deemed the “scourge of modern civilization.” 6
However, rather than prohibit all forms of commercial
communications, Congress “aimed to strike a balance between
protecting consumers from unwanted communications and
enabling legitimate businesses to reach out to consumers that wish
to be contacted.” 7 As a result, both the FCC and the courts grant
considerable weight to legislative intent when analyzing a TCPA
case. 8
In relevant part, the TCPA prohibits businesses from making
any mobile “call” without the “prior express consent” of the
customer with limited exceptions, such as calls made for
emergency purposes. 9 The prohibition of “calls” extends to text
messages, such as those sent via Short Message Service (SMS), as
well as voice calls. 10 While the TCPA does not define what
constitutes “prior express consent,” Congress delegated authority
to the FCC to establish rules and regulations to implement the
TCPA, whereby the FCC's interpretations of TCPA are controlling
unless invalidated by a court of appeals. 11 Accordingly, federal
district courts consistently refer to the FCC's interpretation of the
TCPA when deciding TCPA cases. 12
6

See, e.g., Telemarketing and Robocalls, FCC ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/telemarketing (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
7
O’Rielly, supra note 3.
8
See, e.g., Aderhold, 2014 WL 794802, at *4 (“[T]hose courts, and others,
have been guided by the legislative purposes of the TCPA.”); see also In the
Matter of GroupMe, Inc./ Skype Commc'ns Petition for Expedited Declaratory
Ruling Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
59 Communications Reg. (P & F) 1554 (F.C.C. Mar. 27, 2014) [hereinafter
GroupMe] (exercising discretion to interpret the consent requirement by looking
to the legislative goals underlying the TCPA).
9
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).
10
See, e.g., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th
Cir. 2009) (affording deference to FCC's interpretation of the TCPA that a text
message is a “call” within the TCPA).
11
See 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (the “Hobbs Act”); see also Baird v. Sabre Inc., No.
CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2014) (stating that under the Hobbs Act, the federal courts of appeals have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of final FCC orders).
12
However, it is important to note that FCC Declaratory Rulings are not
binding on courts, and thus may serve only as a source of persuasion. See, e.g.,
Dish Network, L.L.C. v. FCC, 552 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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While non-telemarketing messages, such as purely
informational and non-commercial messages, require “prior
express consent,” heightened TCPA consent rules effective
October 16, 2013, 13 require businesses to obtain a consumer’s
“prior express written consent” before sending a telemarketing
message. 14 The writing requirement can be met through any legally
recognized electronic or digital form, such as one that conforms to
E-SIGN. 15 Notably, the inclusion of the writing requirement adds
an extra hurdle for businesses seeking permissible consent:
whereas businesses can obtain “prior express consent” either
explicitly or implicitly through any reasonable method, 16 they must
explicitly obtain “prior express written consent” by obtaining clear
written consent authorizing the delivery of specified telemarketing
messages. 17 Thus, a business can unwittingly exceed the scope of
consent if, despite obtaining prior express consent, it sends a text
message to a customer that does not fully comply with the terms
provided for in the written consent agreement.
As aforementioned, the vast majority of TCPA claims focus on
non-consent cases. The reason for the popularity of such cases is
that prior express consent is an affirmative defense and businesses
13

The revised TCPA Rules provide for other revisions, such as elimination
of the "established business relationship" exemption for certain telemarketing
calls. Other notable changes provide that a seller cannot require the consumer to
consent to receive an automatic telephone dialing system call as a condition for
a purchase.
14
Federal Communications Commission, “Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,” Report and
Order, FCC 12-21 at ¶ 15 (Feb. 15, 2012); 47 CFR § 64.1200(f)(8) (“The term
prior express written consent means an agreement, in writing, bearing the
signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause
to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages
using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded
voice, and the telephone number to which the signatory authorizes such
advertisements or telemarketing messages to be delivered.”).
15
See generally 29 IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW:
TREATISE WITH FORMS (2nd ed. 2014).
16
See GroupMe, supra note 8, at 3 (“[N]either the Commission’s
implementing rules nor its orders require any specific method by which a caller
must obtain such prior express consent for non-telemarketing calls to wireless
phones.”).
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bear the burden of demonstrating that they obtained proper prior
express written consent from the customers. 18 Accordingly, in
defending against a TCPA non-consent claim, a business must
either show that the mobile marketing text message fell within the
scope of consent provided or was altogether exempted from the
TCPA.
II. DELINEATING THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
In light of Congress’s intent that the TCPA “not be a barrier to
normal, expected, and desired business communications,” 19 both
the FCC and the courts have increasingly adopted a more common
sense approach to evaluating consent for text message
communications. While a common sense approach effectively
broadens the scope of consent, defining the precise contours of
consent is anything but common sense. This Part will provide
some clarity by analyzing two FCC declaratory rulings and three
court cases addressing prior express consent for mobile text
messaging under the TCPA.
A. 2014 FCC Rulings
On March 27, 2014 the FCC released two declaratory rulings
concerning GroupMe, Inc. (GroupMe) and Cargo Airline
Association (CAA) that provided insight into the FCC’s viewpoint
on expanding consent to intermediaries and exempting certain text
messages from the TCPA, respectively. While the rulings contain
important caveats and have limited application given the factintensive holdings, both rulings are favorable to businesses and
imply a trend towards a less strict and more practical interpretation
18

See Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL 1747674, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (citing Pinkard v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12–
CV–2902–CLS, 2012 WL 5511039, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012)) (“Prior
express consent is an affirmative defense, meaning that the defendant bears the
burden of proving it.”).
19
See, e.g., GroupMe, supra note 8, at 3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at
17 (1991) (“The restriction . . . does not apply when the called party has
provided the telephone number of such a line to the caller for use in normal
business communications.”).
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of prior express written consent under the TCPA.
The GroupMe declaratory ruling involved a free group text
messaging service that allows a customer, per GroupMe’s terms
and conditions, to create a group after representing that each
individual added to the group has consented to be added and to
receive text messages. In turn, GroupMe then sends group
members up to four non-telemarketing text messages related to
using and canceling GroupMe’s group texting service. In relevant
part, GroupMe petitioned the FCC to clarify whether these nontelemarketing text messages sent to group members, whereby
consent was obtained through a group organizer intermediary,
were proper under the TCPA.
In response, the FCC concluded that in this context, 20 (1) the
administrative texts did not violate the TCPA because the texts
constituted “normal business communications” to be expected and
desired by the consenting customer, and (2) consent obtained via
an intermediary was proper because such consent facilitated these
normal business communications that the TCPA was not designed
to prevent. 21 In acknowledging that a customer’s consent “extends
to a wide range of calls ‘regarding’ that transaction,” 22 the FCC
found that when a customer voluntarily provides her number to a
group organizer for participating in a GroupMe group, the
GroupMe administrative texts are sufficiently related to the
underlying business transaction, and thus fall within the scope of
consent provided by the customer.
In its CAA ruling, 23 the FCC went a step further and altogether
exempted certain free-to-the-end-user notification text messages
that a package delivery company sent to customers. Although it
could have based the ruling just on an intermediary consent
20

The holding had the important limitation that a group organizer may only
convey the consumer’s prior express consent and that GroupMe was still liable
for breaching the TCPA if the group organizer had not in fact obtained proper
consent. However, this only imposed a condition and not a limitation on the
scope of consent.
21
GroupMe, supra note 8, at 4.
22
Id.
23
In the Matter of Cargo Airline Association Petition for Expedited
Declaratory Ruling Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 2014 WL 1266071 [hereinafter CAA Order].
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theory, 24 the FCC instead exempted such text messages from the
TCPA, under certain pro-consumer conditions, 25 on grounds that
such text messages would protect consumer’s privacy interests
while improving the odds of a successful delivery. Similar to its
approach in GroupMe, the FCC looked to the realities of the
package delivery industry and consumer trends in concluding that
alternative modes of communication would be unduly burdensome
and unnecessary for package delivery companies and their
customers. 26
Despite their fact-intensive holdings, both rulings support the
FCC’s increasing openness to adopting a definition of consent that
protects normal business communications bearing a sufficient
nexus to the underlying consented transaction, even if a consumer
does not individually consent to a given communication and does
not give direct consent to the sender of the text. Indeed, as
businesses are expanding their communications channels in
response to increasing consumer expectations for more
personalized brand experiences, the FCC will likely continue to
expand its interpretation of consent to accommodate such evolving
communications. 27 However, the FCC has also been explicit that
any allowances or exemptions to consent be message-specific, and
any business exceeding this scope to even the smallest degree will
be liable. 28
B. 2014 Court Rulings
In comparison to the FCC, the courts have historically been
more resistant to expanding the definition of consent under the
24

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5 (exempting CAA’s messages from the TCPA under seven
conditions, including that text messages not contain any advertising component
and must include opt-out procedures).
26
Id. (finding that evidence of residential consumers' experience, who
already receive these notifications and have not complained to the FCC,
supports exempting such communications from the TCPA).
27
See generally Robert Passikoff, Brand and Marketing Trends for 2014,
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpassikoff/
2013/12/04/brand-and-marketing-trends-for-2014/.
28
See, e.g., CAA Order, supra note 23, at 5.
25
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TCPA. For instance, courts have differed on whether express
consent can be implied from the customer’s mere act of providing
a cellphone number. 29 However, the emerging judicial trend is
towards a more business-friendly approach that focuses on
industry-specific consumer expectations and business norms.
Furthermore, although the courts still privilege consumer
protection in light of the TCPA’s rationale, the courts are holding
customers to a “reasonable consumer” standard that assumes an
arguably savvy and informed customer.
For instance, in Baird v. Sabre, the court found that a customer,
in providing her mobile telephone number to complete a flight
reservation, had “voluntarily” provided her number, and thus
consented to receive flight-related notification text messages from
both the flight company and its third-party contractors. The
customer argued that she felt compelled to provide her number in
order to finalize the sale and that a reasonable consumer would
“not naturally assume” that she expressly consented to be
contacted at that number by a third party contractor. However, the
court disagreed by adopting a reasonable airline customer standard.
Specifically, the court found that a “reasonable consumer” would
understand that consenting to receive a flight-related text message
from the airline’s contractor “fell within the scope of her prior
express consent.” In its holding, the court assumed that the average
airline customer was a fairly well-informed customer who would
understand the complex dynamics of modern advertising, even if
the actual customer was not in fact so savvy. 30
Similarly, in Aderhold v. Car2go, the court refused to take a
narrow view of prior express consent. 31 In registering for a Car2go
29

E.g., Leckler v. CashCall, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2008),
vacated, 2008 WL 5000528 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (expressing doubts about
FCC’s analysis granting “implied consent” that “flies in the face of Congress’
intent”). But see Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11246, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014) (sympathizing with Leckler
court’s doubts regarding FCC’s interpretation but nevertheless deferring to
FCC’s definition of consent).
30
Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11246, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014).
31
Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL 794802, at
*8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014).
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membership, the customer entered his mobile contact number and
affirmatively clicked three boxes to accept Car2go’s policies.
Car2go’s policies, which were contained in three separate
documents, specified that Car2go would later “confirm acceptance
of the application.” 32 Although Car2go’s policies did not explicitly
state that it would send the customer a text message containing
activation instructions, the court found that “no reasonable person
in his shoes could have doubted that Car2go would contact him in
some manner.” 33 Accordingly, the court found that the message
contacting the customer was “closely related” to the underlying
membership activation agreement since its purpose was to finalize
membership, and thus fell within the scope of the customer’s
consent. Moreover, the court concluded that even if Car2go made
no disclosures regarding how it would use the customer’s
cellphone number, it “defie[d] logic to contend that [the customer]
did not consent to be contacted regarding his membership
application.” 34
In contrast, in Sherman v. Yahoo!, the court denied Yahoo!’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that it was an issue of fact
whether a single notification text message to a consumer as part of
Yahoo!’s Instant Messenger service was sent without the
consumer’s consent because neither Yahoo! nor the third party
who facilitated the text message obtained the consumer’s prior
consent. 35 Unlike the customers in Baird and Car2go, who
received a single text message directly related to a consumerinitiated transaction, the customer in Sherman did not initiate the
service, and thus it was not clear that they did not expect or desire
to receive a message from Yahoo!. 36 The Sherman court affirmed
that “[c]ontext is indisputably relevant to determining whether a
particular [message] is actionable” and concluded that the context
underlying the transaction did not explicitly or impliedly support a
finding of consent. 37
32

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
34
Id.
35
Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 2014 WL 369384, *1 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
36
Id. at 5.
37
Id. at 6.
33
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In all three cases, the courts adopted a fact-intensive inquiry
rooted in common sense that aimed to balance consumer privacy
and normal business communications. While the cases presented
different fact scenarios, the decisions hinged primarily on three
things: (1) the precise language contained in the disclosure
documents, (2) the purpose and timing of the text message, and (3)
the relationship between the sender and initiator of the text
message. Part III of this Article discusses ways that businesses and
their counsel can mitigate TCPA risk regarding text message
communications, in light of the aforementioned factors.
III. MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
Despite the recent FCC and court rulings providing a broader
and more practical reading of consent, businesses and their counsel
must remain vigilant to prevent erroneously exceeding prior
express consent under the TCPA. 38 This Part highlights three
common instances where businesses can exceed the scope of a
customer’s prior express consent under the TCPA and recommends
ways to mitigate such risk. 39

38

It is important to note that aside from limited exceptions, the TCPA does
not preempt state laws that impose more restrictive requirements. See, e.g.,
Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of Indiana, No. 11-3265, 2013 WL 6114836 (7th
Cir. Nov. 21, 2013) (finding that Congress did not intend to create preemption
when it enacted the TCPA). Indeed, Connecticut recently enacted a mini-TCPA
state statute that mirrors the TCPA but provides for statutory damages of up to
$20,000 per violation. See, e.g., Strengthened Connecticut Law Supplements
TOWNSEND
(June
3,
2014),
TCPA,
KILPATRICK
http://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/en/Knowledge_Center/Alerts_and_Podcasts
/Legal_Alerts/2014/06/Strengthened_Connecticut_Law_Supplements_TCPA.as
px. Thus, although beyond the scope of this Article, it is critical to closely watch
both state and federal developments in the area of mobile marketing text
messages.
39
While most of the cited cases directly concern text message
communications, a few relate to mobile phone calls, and thus inferences will be
drawn by analogy. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946,
954 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that a “voice message or a text message are not
distinguishable in terms of being an invasion of privacy” under the TCPA).
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A. Language in Disclosure Documents
The first way that businesses and their counsel can protect
against TCPA consent claims is to ensure that their mobile text
communications do not exceed, even in the slightest degree, the
conditions set forth in their customer disclosures governing such
communications.
The courts meticulously analyze a business’s disclosure
documents, such as the terms and conditions, privacy policy, and
registration documents, to determine whether the given text
message communication falls within the scope of these
disclosures. 40 It is not necessary that the disclosures related to the
text message communication be explicitly stated and neatly
contained in one document. Indeed, the disclosures may be spread
across multiple documents and contain a general statement, such as
“the business will confirm acceptance of the application,” without
explicitly stating the precise mode of communication. 41
However, should a business choose to use precise language in
its disclosure documents, a court will hold the business to that
precise standard. For example, a business disclosing that it will text
a customer up to five text messages per week will likely be held to
that exact number, and any text messages exceeding this number,
even one, will likely be read as exceeding the scope of the
customer’s consent under the TCPA. 42 Accordingly, to prevent an
erroneous deviation, it is best practice for businesses to use
general, rather than specific, language in their disclosure
documents.

40

See, e.g., Aderhold v. Car2go N.A., LLC, No. C12–489RAJ, 2014 WL
794802, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014) (closely analyzing Terms and
Conditions, Trip Process, and Privacy Policy documents controlling customer’s
membership application and subsequent participation in the trip process).
41
Id. at 6.
42
Don’t Text & Cheer: Fan Sues Buffalo Bills for $3 Million, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BLOG (May 12, 2014, 11:04 am),
https://www.uschamber.com/blog/don-t-text-cheer-fan-sues-buffalo-bills-3million.
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B. Purpose and Timing of Text Messages
In addition, businesses and their counsel must ensure that the
purpose and timing of any text message communication are
consistent with the customer’s consent.
First, the purpose of a text message communication may be for
promotional or informational purposes, or a combination of the
two. A message containing a mix of telemarketing and nontelemarketing information constitutes a “dual purpose” message.
Courts closely analyze messages and will find that a message
contains a promotional element if there is either a direct or implied
sales offer. 43 Accordingly, if a customer only consents to receiving
an informational message, the business cannot then send a
promotional 44 or a dual-purpose message. 45
On the other hand, courts are more forgiving about the content
of a given informational text message, finding that the “TCPA
does not require the call to be for the exact purpose for which the
number was provided.” 46 However, the content of the message
must bear sufficient relation to the product or service for which the
customer provided her number. Accordingly, businesses must
ensure that any text message relates to the same or a closely
connected product or service. Furthermore, as mentioned before, a
heightened level of consent is required for telemarketing messages.
Thus, businesses must ensure that the purpose of a text message
43

Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores Inc., 697 F.3d 1230, as amended by 705 F.3d
913 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that a text message warning of the expiration of
rewards points, and instructing how to preserve them, was a telemarketing
message).
44
See e.g., Connelly, et al., v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., LLC, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS at *11 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that hotel company sending
promotional texts to customers, who made hotel reservations and submitted their
cell phone numbers, exceeded the scope of consent).
45
See, e.g., Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores L.P., 705 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding that scope of consent was exceeded when consent was given for only
informational calls, but business later sent dual-purpose call).
46
See, e.g., Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL
1747674, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (noting that educational company could
send educational-related calls, finding that employment-related calls may be
sufficiently related to underlying transaction, depending on the factual
circumstances).
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communication is compliant with both the dual TCPA standards
and the customer’s consent.
Second, regarding timing, businesses must be careful that they
send text messages and obtain a customer’s mobile number within
a proper timeframe. For instance, the FCC ruled that only
confirmatory messages sent within five minutes of an opt-out
request will be presumed to fall within the scope of a customer’s
consent, and the sender bears the burden of showing any delay was
in fact reasonable. 47 Furthermore, a business must ensure that it
receives a customer’s mobile contact information before the
finalization of the business transaction. 48 Accordingly, the
inflexible timeframe means that businesses must ensure that proper
mechanisms are in place to acquire customers’ mobile numbers
and send mobile communications in a timely fashion.
C. Third Party Affiliates
The final way that businesses and their counsel can protect
against TCPA consent claims is to ensure that all text message
communications are sent by third parties closely affiliated with the
business, where the content of such communication bears a
sufficient relation to the service or product for which the customer
provided her number. 49 Even if the consumer did not explicitly
consent to receiving text messages from an affiliated entity, courts
will apply a “reasonable customer” standard in determining
whether a customer’s consent extends to receiving messages from
third-party contractors. In recent cases, courts have extended the
scope of consent to third-party messages related to the transaction
47

In the Matter of SoundBite Communications Petition for Expedited
Declaratory Ruling Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 15391, 15391, 2012 WL
5986338.
48
See Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 696 F.3d 943 (9th Cir.
2012) (finding that procurement of cell phone number after original business
transaction does not amount to proper consent under the TCPA).
49
See, e.g., Baird v. Sabre Inc., No. CV 13-CV–999 SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11246 (C.D. Cal. Jan.28, 2014) (finding that text messages sent from an
airline’s third part vendor concerning flight-related matters fell within the scope
of consent that the customer gave to the airline).
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that a reasonable customer could assume and expect to receive, but
courts have not extended the scope of consent to messages sent by
a completely unaffiliated company in a separate industry. 50
Furthermore, if a third party hired by a business sends a mobile
marketing text message without consent to a consumer in violation
of the TCPA, the business may be held vicariously liable under
federal common law agency principles. 51 Indeed, no formal agency
relationship is required for liability, and a business can also be held
liable through the principles of apparent authority or ratification. 52
Accordingly, businesses and their counsel must pay attention to
reasonable consumer expectations and their relationships with third
party senders when initiating mobile marketing text messages.
CONCLUSION
The FCC’s and courts’ recent adoption of a common sense
analysis will allow businesses to more freely communicate with
their mobile customers, so long as such communications align with
reasonable consumer expectations and established business norms.
However, businesses and their counsel must implement
comprehensive safeguards to protect against TCPA consent claims.
Because courts are split on good faith defenses, 53 it is necessary
not to make any assumptions regarding consent, even if made in
good faith. Accordingly, as it is likely that the FCC and the courts
will continue to expand the scope of consent under the TCPA, it is
a smart business practice to adapt consent and disclosure policies
in a piecemeal fashion to the evolving TCPA legal landscape.

50

See Satterfield, supra note 38, at 955 (concluding that text messages sent
from a cellphone provider’s unaffiliated publishing company concerning
publishing related matters fell outside the scope of consent that consumer
provided to cellphone provider).
51
See, e.g., In re DISH Network, LLC, 2013 WL 1934349, FCC 13-54
(May 9, 2013).
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Olney v. Job.com, Inc., 1:12-CV-01724-LJO, 2014 WL
1747674, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) (noting that while some courts have
suggested that the TCPA is a strict liability statute, other courts have allowed for
a good faith exception to liability).
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Since the statute of limitations for a federal TCPA claim is
four years, it is important to keep records of customer
consent for at least four years.



When in doubt, do not make any assumptions. Although
the FCC’s effort to clarify the TCPA through declaratory
rulings is not very efficient, one option is to petition the
FCC for an expedited declaratory ruling.



The consent rules are merely a floor. Just because a form of
mobile communication may be permitted under the TCPA
does not prevent customers from finding such
communications annoying and seeking out competitors
with less invasive communication strategies.



In the event of a TCPA consent claim, argue that the text
message was within the scope of consent provided and that
consent in such case would not frustrate TCPA’s
underlying rationale.

